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中文题名:

 逆向混改背景下控制权变更对金一文化绩效的影响研究    

姓名:

 刘珊    

学号:

 20212116003    

保密级别:

 公开    

论文语种:

 chi    

学科代码:

 125300    

学科名称:

 管理学 - 会计    

学生类型:

 硕士    

学位:

 管理学硕士    

学位类型:

 专业学位    

学位年度:

 2023    

学校:

 石河子大学    

院系:

 经济与管理学院    

专业:

 会计    

研究方向:

 不区分研究方向    

第一导师姓名:

 吴春贤    

第一导师单位:

 石河子大学    

完成日期:

 2023-05-10    

答辩日期:

 2023-05-12    

外文题名:

 Research on the Impact of Control Rights Change on the Performance of Jinyi Culture under the Background of Reverse Mixed Reform    

中文关键词:

 民营企业 ; 逆向混改 ; 控制权变更 ; 影响路径 ; 企业绩效     

外文关键词:

 Private enterprise ; Reverse mixed reform ; Change of control ; Influence path ; Enterprise performance     

中文摘要:

民营企业作为我国经济的重要组成部分,在推动我国经济高速增长、增加政府税收及促进就业方面,起到至关重要的作用。然而,民营企业的发展却常常受到融资渠道、行业准入及资源配置等方面的掣肘。因此,为推动我国民营企业的健康发展,2015年国务院提出要鼓励国有企业以多种形式入股非国有企业,由此拉开了我国企业逆向混改的序幕。随后,2018年受我国宏观经济下行以及信贷政策紧缩的影响,大部分民营企业的发展受到重创;在这种情况下,逐渐涌现出多起民营企业引入国有企业实施逆向混改的案例,然而以往学者对于民营企业实施逆向混改方面的案例研究相对较少。因此,本文选择从民营企业的视角出发,以金一文化典型案例作为研究对象,通过分析总结其实施逆向混改的经验与启示,以期丰富我国在逆向混改方面的研究,并为我国其他同行业的公司在实施逆向混改时提供参考。

本文以资源基础理论、协同效应理论和委托代理理论作为理论基础,运用文献研究法、案例研究法、事件研究法以及熵值法,首先对金一文化实施逆向混改的过程进行梳理,并分析其实施逆向混改的原因;其次,分别从获得异质性资源、提高经营管理效率以及改善公司治理结构三个方面分析影响企业绩效的路径;再次,从市场绩效、财务绩效、公司治理绩效以及创新绩效四个方面分析金一文化实施逆向混改后的绩效表现;最后,根据本文的研究结论,提出了针对性的建议。

研究发现:首先,金一文化实施逆向混改的动因主要是:缓解资金压力,拓宽融资渠道、解决股权质押平仓危机以及改善公司经营现状;其次,逆向混改主要从获得异质性资源、提高经营管理效率以及改善公司治理结构这三条路径对金一文化的绩效产生了影响;最后,控制权变更为国有企业后,金一文化的市场绩效、财务绩效以及治理绩效仅在短期内有所提升,在后期均出现了下降,而公司的创新绩效自控制权变更后,基本上呈现下降的趋势,因此,总体来看,逆向混改后金一文化的绩效有短期的提升,但长期绩效并没有得到明显的改善。通过对金一文化逆向混改的案例进行分析,发现金一文化在实施逆向混改中存在以下问题:第一,金一文化与国有企业没有积极推进混改后的整合工作,双方没有形成良好的协同效应;第二,逆向混改后,金一文化的股权配置不合理,国有股权占比过重,可能会削弱民营企业的活力;第三,金一文化选择的国有战略投资者与公司的战略规划不匹配,在战略层面不能形成良好的协同作用。针对金一文化在实施逆向混改中所存在的问题,本文主要提出以下三点建议:第一,民营企业应注重混改后的整合工作;第二,应合理安排混改后的股权结构,积极发挥民营企业的活力;第三,民营企业应选择合适的国有战略投资者。

外文摘要:

As an important part of China's economy, private enterprises play a vital role in promoting rapid economic growth, increasing government tax revenue, and promoting employment. However, the development of private enterprises is often constrained by financing channels, industry access, and resource allocation. To promote the healthy development of private enterprises in China, in 2015, the State Council proposed to encourage state-owned enterprises to invest in non-state-owned enterprises in various forms, which opened the prelude to the reverse mixed reform of Chinese enterprises. Subsequently, in 2018, under the influence of China's macroeconomic downturn and credit policy tightening, the development of most private enterprises was hit hard. In this case, many cases of private enterprises introducing state-owned enterprises to implement reverse mixed reform gradually emerged. However, there are few case studies on the implementation of reverse mixed reform by private enterprises in the past. Therefore, this thesis chooses the typical case of Jinyi Culture as the research object from the perspective of private enterprises, and summarizes the experience and enlightenment of its implementation of reverse mixed reform, in order to enrich the research on reverse mixed reform in China, and provide experience for other companies in the same industry in China when implementing reverse mixed reform.

Based on the resource-based theory, synergistic effect theory, and principal-agent theory, this thesis uses literature research method, case study method, event research method, and entropy method to sort out the process of reverse mixed reform of Jinyi Culture and analyze the reasons for its implementation of reverse mixed reform. Secondly, it analyzes the path of influencing enterprise performance from three aspects: obtaining core resources, improving management efficiency, and improving corporate governance structure. Thirdly, it analyzes the performance of Jinyi Culture after the implementation of reverse mixed reform from four aspects: market performance, financial performance, corporate governance performance, and innovation performance. Finally, according to the research conclusions of this thesis, some suggestions are put forward.

The study found that : First of all, the motivation of Jinyi Culture to implement reverse mixed reform is mainly to alleviate financial pressure, broaden financing channels, solve the crisis of equity pledge liquidation and improve the company 's operating status. Secondly, reverse mixed reform mainly affects the performance of Jinyi Culture from three paths : obtaining core resources, improving management efficiency and improving corporate governance structure. Finally, after the change of control rights to state-owned enterprises, the market performance, financial performance and governance performance of Jinyi Culture only improved in the short term, and decreased in the later period, while the company 's innovation performance has basically shown a downward trend since the change of control rights ; therefore, on the whole, the performance of Jinyi Culture has a short-term improvement after the reverse mixed reform, but the long-term performance has not been significantly improved. Through the analysis of the case of Jinyi Culture 's reverse mixed reform, it is found that Jinyi Culture has the following problems in the implementation of reverse mixed reform : first, Jinyi Culture and state-owned enterprises did not actively promote the integration work after the mixed reform, and the two sides did not form a good synergistic effect ; second, after the reverse mixed reform, the equity allocation of Jinyi Culture is unreasonable, and the proportion of state-owned equity is too heavy, which may weaken the vitality of private enterprises ; third, the state-owned strategic investors selected by Jinyi Culture do not match the company 's strategic planning and cannot form a good synergy at the strategic level. In view of the problems existing in the implementation of reverse mixed reform of Jinyi Culture, this thesis mainly puts forward the following three suggestions : first, private enterprises should pay attention to the integration work after mixed reform ; second, we should reasonably arrange the ownership structure after the mixed reform and actively play the vitality of private enterprises ; third, private enterprises should choose the appropriate state-owned strategic investors.

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中图分类号:

 F23    

开放日期:

 2023-05-23    

无标题文档

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