消费作为驱动经济持续增长的核心动能，不仅是畅通国内大循环的关键引擎，也是构建强大国内市场的重要基石。当前，内需不足是制约我国经济发展的结构性难题。据国家统计局数据，2024年我国社会消费品零售总额同比增长3.5%，较2023年回落3.7个百分点，增速大幅低于新冠疫情前8%以上的水平。内需对经济增长贡献率为69.7%，其中最终消费支出贡献率为44.5%，相比2023年有所下滑。为促进经济的可持续发展，扩大居民消费需求已成为推动我国经济可持续发展的基本战略。党的二十大报告指出，实施供给侧结构性改革，着力扩大内需，增强消费对经济发展的基础性作用。党的二十届三中全会进一步明确提到，深化供给侧结构性改革，落实好宏观政策，积极扩大国内需求。2025年政府工作报告也强调，持续深化供给侧结构性改革，着力破解消费供给的结构性矛盾，注重以高质量供给引领需求、创造需求，大力提振消费、全方位扩大国内需求。

然而，目前我国在扩大内需和刺激消费方面仍面临诸多制约因素，其中消费供给的结构性矛盾尤为突出。消费供给结构性矛盾表现为原来单一、粗放的消费供给方式与当下日益个性化、多层次、时代特色鲜明的消费需求之间存在不匹配、不平衡问题。我国居民消费结构正在发生深刻变化，消费需求不断升级，但中高端消费品依然匮乏，难以有效满足消费者需求，呈现出供需结构不匹配的特征。因此，推动消费品工业迈向中高端发展，缓解消费供给的结构性矛盾，对于更好地满足和创造消费需求，增强消费拉动经济的基础作用具有重要意义。

消费品工业是我国重要民生产业和传统优势产业，在稳增长、促改革、调结构及惠民生等方面发挥了重要作用。为推进供给侧结构性改革，促进消费品工业迈向中高端发展，更好地满足和创造消费需求，国务院于2016年5月发布了《国务院办公厅关于开展消费品工业“三品”专项行动营造良好市场环境的若干意见》，标志着我国消费品工业迈向中高端发展的重要战略部署正式拉开帷幕。同年9月，工信部正式颁布了消费品工业“三品”战略示范城市试点政策，为观察“三品”战略对微观企业的影响及其作用机制提供了绝佳的场景。“三品”战略示范城市试点政策旨在推动消费品工业转型升级，缓解消费供给的结构性矛盾，满足居民日益增长的消费需求，从而更好地实现有为政府与有效市场的有机结合。

在供给侧结构性改革的背景下，微观企业的责任和使命愈发重要。“三品”战略示范城市试点政策通过影响供给端微观企业的经济活动，缓解消费供给的结构性矛盾，带动消费需求的增长，从而促进经济高质量发展。在企业经济活动中，投资行为尤为关键，它不仅能够直接影响产品供给的规模与质量，还对经济的稳定增长和内需的扩张具有重要作用。根据“三品”战略示范城市试点政策导向，本研究将企业投资行为分为固定资产投资、创新投资以及并购投资。在固定资产投资夯实企业实体根基的基础上，创新投资能够进一步提升企业的产品品种和品质，赢得核心竞争力。同时，企业通过并购获取固定资产和创新资源，快速拓展市场，加速资源整合，增强自身的品牌影响力。

基于此，本文从固定资产投资、创新投资和并购投资视角出发，以2010—2023年沪深A股上市公司消费品制造业企业为研究样本，基于资源基础理论、融资约束理论、信号传递理论和资源配置理论，考察“三品”战略示范城市试点政策如何影响企业投资行为，并且尝试回答以下问题：第一，试点政策对企业固定资产投资、创新投资和并购投资有何影响？第二，试点政策对企业投资行为的影响机制是什么？第三，不同的地区环境、行业状况以及企业特征如何影响试点政策与企业投资行为之间的关系？第四，试点政策对企业投资行为的影响效应最终会对企业增加值和全要素生产率产生何种影响？本文的主要研究结论如下：

首先，从固定资产投资视角来看，“三品”战略示范城市试点政策对企业固定资产投资产生显著正向影响，且这一影响在营商环境、数字经济发展较好的地区，在行业竞争程度、行业景气度较高的行业，以及处于成长期、现金柔性较高的企业中表现更为明显。并且，试点政策主要通过加强企业内部监督以及缓解企业融资约束两个渠道提升企业固定资产投资。进一步地，试点政策对企业固定资产投资的促进效应最终能够显著提高企业全要素生产率和企业增加值；同时，试点政策促进企业固定资产投资的过程中，企业固定资产投资的增加并非由于高管显性或隐性的自利动机所致。

其次，从创新投资视角来看，“三品”战略示范城市试点政策对企业创新投资产生显著正向影响，且这一影响在营商环境、数字经济发展较好的地区，在行业竞争程度、行业景气度较高的行业，以及处于成长期、高管创新意识较强的企业中表现更为明显。并且，试点政策主要通过加强企业内部监督、缓解企业融资约束、提升企业人力资本水平，以及吸引媒体关注，进而提升企业创新投资。进一步地，试点政策对企业创新投资的促进效应最终能够显著提高企业全要素生产率和企业增加值；同时，试点政策对企业创新产出和创新持续性同样产生促进作用。

最后，从并购投资视角来看，“三品”战略示范城市试点政策对企业并购投资产生显著正向影响，且这一影响在营商环境、数字经济发展较好的地区，在行业竞争程度、行业景气度较高的行业，以及处于成长期、差异化战略较高的企业中表现更为明显。并且，试点政策主要通过加强企业内部监督、缓解企业融资约束、增加企业信息透明度，以及提升企业风险承担水平，进而促进企业并购投资。进一步地，试点政策对企业并购投资的促进效应最终能够显著提高企业全要素生产率和企业增加值；同时，试点政策对企业短期和长期并购绩效同样产生促进作用。

与已有文献相比，本研究的主要贡献在于：第一，在研究视角上，本研究立足于“三品”战略示范城市试点政策这一场景，构建了“宏观政策—微观企业”互动机制的分析框架。目前关于扩大内需的相关政策大多作用于消费端，例如消费品以旧换新的国家补贴政策通过直接补贴、税收减免、可换购优惠以及老旧产品回收等方式直接或间接减轻消费者的经济负担，降低消费成本，增强消费者信心，进而拉动消费需求，扩大内需。与之不同，本研究从供给端消费品企业的角度出发，探讨了“三品”战略示范城市试点政策对企业投资行为的影响，为扩大内需提供了供给端微观企业层面的实际数据支持，为企业投资行为的调整提供了现实依据，并助力于企业实现高质量发展，进而从供给侧为扩大内需提供持久动力。

第二，在研究内容上，本研究厘清了“三品”战略示范城市试点政策影响企业投资行为的内在逻辑与传导路径。本研究通过对相关文献的归纳，梳理了“三品”战略示范城市试点政策影响企业固定资产投资、创新投资和并购投资的中介机制，如内部监督、融资约束、人力资本水平、媒体关注、信息透明度和风险承担水平等。这使得路径分析更加全面、科学严谨，并为后续相关领域的学术研究提供了理论参考。

第三，在研究方法上，本研究凭借“三品”战略示范城市试点政策这一外生冲击，综合运用了双向固定效应模型和双重差分模型，并且采用了平行趋势、安慰剂、多时点DID异质性处理效应、工具变量、PSM以及Heckman等一系列稳健性检验。这些方法的综合运用不仅有效缓解了内生性问题的干扰，而且增强了研究结论的因果推断力。

第四，在研究成果上，“三品”战略示范城市试点政策显著促进了企业固定资产投资、创新投资以及并购投资。这表明试点政策能够有效激发企业投资积极性，夯实实体经济根基，提升整体创新效能，优化资源配置与整合，推动现代产业结构升级。同时，为政府推广试点政策提供了实证依据，为消费品企业调整投资策略提供了实践参考，助力消费品工业向中高端发展，满足并创造消费需求。

Consumption, as the core driver of sustained economic growth, serves not only as the key engine for facilitating the domestic economic cycle but also as a vital cornerstone for building a robust domestic market. Currently, insufficient domestic demand remains a structural challenge constraining China's economic development. According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, China's total retail sales of consumer goods grew by 3.5% year-on-year in 2024, a 3.7 percentage point decline from 2023, with the growth rate significantly lower than the pre-pandemic level exceeding 8%. The contribution rate of domestic demand to economic growth is 69.7%, of which the contribution rate of final consumption expenditure is 44.5%, which is a decline compared with 2023. To promote sustainable economic development, expanding consumer demand has become a fundamental strategy for driving China's sustainable economic growth. The report of the 20th CPC National Congress emphasized implementing supply-side structural reforms, focusing on expanding domestic demand, and enhancing the foundational role of consumption in economic development. The Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee further clarified the need to deepen supply-side structural reforms, effectively implement macro policies, and actively expand domestic demand. The 2025 Government Work Report also emphasized the need to continuously deepen supply-side structural reform, address structural imbalances in consumption supply, focus on using high-quality supply to guide and create demand, vigorously boost consumption, and comprehensively expand domestic demand.

However, China still faces numerous constraints in expanding domestic demand and stimulating consumption, with structural contradictions in consumption supply being particularly prominent. The structural contradiction of consumption supply is manifested in the mismatch and imbalance between the original single and extensive consumption supply mode and the increasingly personalized, multi-level, and distinctive consumer demand of the times. China's consumer structure is undergoing profound changes, with consumption demands continuously upgrading. However, mid-to-high-end consumer goods remain scarce, failing to effectively meet consumer needs and revealing a structural mismatch between supply and demand. Therefore, propelling the consumer goods industry toward mid-to-high-end development and alleviating the structural contradictions in consumption supply are crucial for better satisfying and creating consumption demands, thereby strengthening consumption's foundational role in driving economic growth.

The consumer goods industry is a vital sector for people's livelihoods and a traditional strength of China's economy, playing a significant role in stabilizing economic growth, promoting reform, adjusting the economic structure, and improving people's well-being. To advance supply-side structural reform, promote the development of the consumer goods industry toward the mid-to-high end, and better meet and create consumer demand, the State Council issued the "Several Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Launching the 'Three-Product' Special Action for the Consumer Goods Industry to Foster a Favorable Market Environment" in May 2016. This marked the official commencement of a major strategic deployment for China's consumer goods industry to advance toward mid-to-high-end development. In September of the same year, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology formally promulgated the pilot policy for "three-product" strategic demonstration cities in the consumer goods industry, providing an ideal setting to observe the impact of the "three-product" strategy on micro-level enterprises and its operational mechanisms. This pilot policy aims to drive the transformation and upgrading of the consumer goods industry, alleviate structural contradictions in consumption supply, and meet the growing consumption demands of residents, thereby better achieving the organic combination of an effective government and an efficient market.

Under the background of supply-side structural reform, the responsibilities and missions of micro-enterprises have become increasingly significant. The pilot policy of the "three-product" strategic demonstration city alleviates the structural contradiction of consumption supply and drives the growth of consumption demand by affecting the economic activities of micro-enterprises on the supply side, thus promoting high-quality economic development. In the economic activities of enterprises, investment behavior is particularly critical. It can not only directly affect the scale and quality of product supply, but also play an important role in the stable growth of the economy and the expansion of domestic demand. According to the "three-product" strategic demonstration city pilot policy guidance, this study divides corporate investment behavior into fixed asset investment, innovation investment, and M&A investment. Based on the solid foundation of fixed asset investment, innovation investment can further improve the product variety and quality of enterprises and win core competitiveness. Concurrently, enterprises acquire fixed assets and innovative resources through mergers and acquisitions, rapidly expanding the market, accelerating resource integration, and enhancing their brand influence.

Based on this, from the perspective of fixed asset investment, innovation investment, and M&A investment, this thesis takes the consumer goods manufacturing enterprises of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2023 as the research sample. Based on the resource-based theory, financing constraint theory, signal transmission theory, and resource allocation theory, this thesis examines how the pilot policy of the "three-product" strategic demonstration city affects the investment behavior of enterprises, and tries to answer the following questions: First, what is the impact of the pilot policy on fixed asset investment, innovation investment, and M&A investment? Second, what is the impact mechanism of the pilot policy on corporate investment behavior? Third, how do different regional environments, industry conditions, and corporate characteristics affect the relationship between pilot policies and corporate investment behavior? Fourth, what will the impact of the pilot policy on the investment behavior of enterprises ultimately have on the added value and total factor productivity of enterprises? The main conclusions of this thesis are as follows:

First, from the perspective of fixed asset investment, the pilot policy of "three-product" strategic demonstration cities has a significant positive impact on fixed asset investment of enterprises. This effect is more pronounced in regions with favorable business environments and robust digital economic development, in industries characterized by intense competition and high prosperity, as well as among enterprises in the growth stage and those with greater cash flexibility. Moreover, the pilot policy primarily enhances enterprise fixed asset investment through two channels: strengthening internal supervision and alleviating financing constraints. Furthermore, the promotion effect of the pilot policy on fixed asset investment can ultimately significantly improve the total factor productivity and added value of enterprises. Crucially, the increase in fixed asset investment driven by the pilot policy is not attributable to explicit or implicit self-serving motives of corporate executives.

Second, from the perspective of innovation investment, the pilot policy of the "three-product" strategic demonstration city has a significant positive impact on the innovation investment of enterprises. This effect is more pronounced in regions with favorable business environments and robust digital economic development, in industries characterized by intense competition and high prosperity, as well as among enterprises in the growth stage and those with executives possessing strong innovation awareness. Moreover, the pilot policy primarily enhances corporate innovation investment by strengthening internal supervision, alleviating financing constraints, elevating human capital levels, and attracting media attention. Furthermore, the promotion effect of the pilot policy on innovation investment can ultimately significantly improve the total factor productivity and added value of enterprises. Concurrently, the pilot policy also promotes the innovation output and innovation sustainability of enterprises.

Third, from the perspective of M&A investment, the pilot policy of the "three-product" strategic demonstration city has a significant positive impact on the M&A investment of enterprises. This effect is more pronounced in regions with favorable business environments and robust digital economic development, in industries characterized by intense competition and high prosperity, as well as among enterprises in the growth stage and those with high differentiation strategies. Moreover, the pilot policy primarily enhances corporate M&A investment by strengthening internal supervision, alleviating financing constraints, elevating information transparency, and elevating risk-bearing capacity. Furthermore, the promotion effect of the pilot policy on M&A investment can ultimately significantly improve the total factor productivity and added value of enterprises. Concurrently, the pilot policy also promotes the short-term and long-term M&A performance of enterprises.

Compared with the existing literature, the main contributions of this study are as follows: First, in terms of research perspective, based on the pilot policy of the "three-product" strategic demonstration city, this study constructs an analytical framework of the interaction mechanism of "macro-policy-micro-enterprise". At present, most of the relevant policies on expanding domestic demand act on the consumer side. For example, national subsidy policies for consumer goods trade-ins directly or indirectly alleviate consumers' financial burdens through direct subsidies, tax breaks, trade-in incentives, and old product recycling. These measures reduce consumption costs, boost consumer confidence, thereby stimulating consumer demand and expanding domestic demand. In contrast, from the perspective of supply-side consumer goods enterprises, this study explores the impact of the "three-product" strategic demonstration city pilot policy on corporate investment behavior. This provides actual data support for expanding domestic demand at the micro-enterprise level of the supply side and provides a realistic basis for the adjustment of corporate investment behavior. Simultaneously, it assists enterprises to achieve high-quality development, thereby providing sustained momentum for expanding domestic demand from the supply side.

Second, in terms of research content, this study clarifies the internal logic and transmission path of the "three-product" strategic demonstration city pilot policy affecting corporate investment behavior. Through a synthesis of relevant literature, this study identifies the intermediary mechanisms of the pilot policy of "three-product" strategic demonstration cities affecting fixed asset investment, innovation investment, and M&A investment, such as internal supervision, financing constraints, human capital level, media attention, information transparency, and risk-taking level. This makes the path analysis more comprehensive, scientific, and rigorous, and provides a theoretical reference for subsequent academic research in related fields.

Third, in terms of research methods, this study relies on the exogenous impact of the "three-product" strategic demonstration city pilot policy, comprehensively uses the two-way fixed effect model and the double difference model, and adopts a series of robustness tests such as parallel trend, placebo, multi-time DID heterogeneity treatment effect, instrumental variable, PSM, and Heckman. The comprehensive application of these methods not only effectively alleviates the interference of endogenous problems, but also enhances the causal inference of research conclusions.

Fourth, in terms of research results, the pilot policy of the "three-product" strategic demonstration city has significantly promoted the investment in fixed assets, innovation investment and M&A investment of enterprises. This shows that the pilot policy can effectively stimulate the enthusiasm of enterprises to invest, consolidate the foundation of the real economy, enhance the overall innovation efficiency, optimize the allocation and integration of resources, and promote the upgrading of the modern industrial structure. At the same time, these findings provide empirical evidence for the government to promote pilot policies and practical guidance for consumer goods enterprises to adjust their investment strategies, thereby supporting the consumer goods industry's transition toward mid-to-high-end development and helping to meet and create consumer demand.

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